Desire Satisfaction Theory’s Weaknesses

Desire Satisfaction Theory’s Weaknesses
Desire satisfaction theory is plausible on the face of it. However, it is also susceptible to criticism. Let’s
raise some objections to the theory.
1. Ignorance about desire fulfillment. The simplest form of desire satisfaction theory says that I am
always better off when my desires are fulfilled. But what if my desires are fulfilled without my ever
knowing about it? Two examples illustrate this.
Shelley Kagan gives the example of someone who loves prime numbers. This person has such an
affection for prime numbers that he desires that the total number of molecules in the universe be
prime. If this were the case and he knew it, he would be pleased indeed. Unfortunately, there is no
possible way to determine the total number of molecules in the universe. So, it’s quite possible that the
number is indeed prime, but this person cannot know about it. Is his life better off in any way just
because the number really is prime? Surely not.
If that desire seems too outlandish, take this example from Derek Parfit. Suppose you are on a train and
you fall into conversation with the woman in the seat next to you. In the course of this conversation, you
discover that this woman has many troubles in life. Perhaps she is ill or has difficulties with her family or
her love life. At the same time, you like this woman—she seems kind and good, and you genuinely
desire that her problems will be solved. When you leave the train, you shake her hand and wish her
well, and of course you never meet her again. She is just a stranger on a train. Perhaps in later life, you
will remember this train ride and think, “I hope things worked out for her.” But you will never know.
Now, suppose that as a matter of fact things did work out for this woman. Since you don’t know about
it, does this make your life better in any way? It doesn’t seem to.
2. Desires that change. Obviously, we do not have the same desires over the whole course of our life.
When I was eight, I wanted nothing more than to own a Cabbage Patch Kid, but needless to say that is
no longer among my desires. It is no surprise that our desires change with age and experience, but what
is desire satisfaction theory to make of this? If someone gives me a Cabbage Patch Kid for my forty-first
birthday, then one of my desires will be at long last be fulfilled, but I can’t say that I think this will make
my life go any better. 9
Likewise, sometimes our lives seem to go better when our desires are frustrated in the moment,
because we later on acquire a new desire. What I actually did receive as a present when I was eight was
a set of luggage. Needless to say, to an eight-year-old, this was a deeply unfulfilling gift. But I still have
the suitcases, and I still use them. I think I can honestly say that having them has made my life go better,
because as an adult, if I didn’t have luggage, I would desire it. So, the suitcases fulfill a current desire,
but they didn’t fulfill any desire at the time. How is desire satisfaction theory to analyze this? Did the
luggage make me better off or not? Do the fulfilled and unfulfilled desires cancel each other out, or does
one have greater weight than the other?
3. Poorly informed desires. We could look at the case of the luggage in a different way and suggest that
an eight-year-old simply has poorly informed desires. Perhaps I would have desired such a gift as a child
if I had had a better understanding of adult life and its needs. Often times, we have desires that are
poorly informed or even misinformed.
Consider the case of the Central Park Five. In 1989, a woman was assaulted and raped while jogging in
Central Park in New York City. Five young men were subsequently arrested and accused with the crime.
The whole nation watched this case with great interest, because the crime was very brutal, and many
people expressed strong desires that the young men be harshly punished. The men were convicted and
given prison sentences, and thus the desires of many Americans were fulfilled. But in 2002, another man
came forward and confessed to the crime. DNA evidence then confirmed that this man was the real
perpetrator, and that the “Central Park Five” had been wrongly convicted. They hadn’t committed the
crime at all. But what about all those Americans who followed the story on the news? They desired the
young men to be imprisoned, and this desire was fulfilled. Were these Americans better off because of
the men’s wrongful imprisonment? Surely not. The fulfillment of our ill-informed desires does not seem
to improve our lives.
Suicide can be another disturbing example of an ill-informed desire. Suppose that a man is so depressed
that he takes no enjoyment in life and feels no hope for the future. He is convinced that he will never
feel good again and that the future can bring him nothing but suffering. He eventually concludes that
the only solution to his problem is to take his own life. If he succeeds in committing suicide, his desire
for death will be satisfied, but is suicide a sign of a life going well? Surely not. On the contrary, we would
want to point out to this man that he has lots of things to live for and that he has many reasons to hope
for a bright future. His depression is skewing his understanding and hiding from him all the good reasons
that he has to live. In short, we are well aware that not all desires are realistic or well-formed—
sometimes they are ill informed and confused. The fulfillment of these wrong-headed desires does not
seem to contribute to well-being.
Fine-Tuning Desire Satisfaction Theory
The objections raised above are signs that the simplest version of desire satisfaction theory isn’t good
enough. Lives do not always seem to go well to the extent that intrinsic desires are fulfilled. One
response is to revise desire satisfaction theory to meet these objections. A more sophisticated desire
satisfaction theory might suggest that our lives go well to the extent that our intrinsic desires are
fulfilled, so long as these desires are also informed, concurrent with their fulfillment, and so long as we
are also aware that the desires are being fulfilled.
This new version of the theory would address objections 1 – 3 above. Notice that this new version turns
desire satisfaction theory into a mental state theory—it makes our well-being dependent on whether or
not we have a certain mental state. Our liv