Eudaimonism, Hedonism, and Desire Satisfaction Theory

Eudaimonism, Hedonism, and Desire Satisfaction Theory
Value theory is the branch of ethics that attempts to define human well-being, welfare, or the “good
life.” It represents a preparation for normative ethics, which makes moral judgments about actions and
character. We need some preparation for this, because actions and character are not the only things we
attach value to. It is part of our ordinary experience to look at the quality of people’s lives and judge
some lives to be preferable to others.
Notice that this is not a moral judgment—we are not saying that some lives are more morally valuable
than others, just that some lives are in some sense preferable to others. For instance, we might judge a
life of pain and frustration as one that is less desirable than one that is full of pleasure and achievement.
That does not necessarily mean that the people who lead those lives are better or worse people or that
they take better or worse actions. Value theory is about what sorts of things we count as valuable to
one’s life, not about morality per se.
If value theory is not really about morality, then why is it part of ethics? It is part of ethics because
before we can make judgments about what sort of people we should be or what sorts of actions we
should take, it is helpful to have a clear idea of what it means for a life to go well. It is the job of a
normative theory to explain what counts as good and bad character traits or right and wrong actions. In
particular, value theory is important for understanding consequentialist normative theories, which argue
that actions are right when they optimize people’s well-being. But in order to do that, we would have to
know what it means to have a high quality of life. So, most normative theories—especially
consequentialist ones—have some value theory underlying them.
To better understand the purpose of value theory, as distinct from normative theory, consider the
following story, reported 2017:
“The painful death of a diabetic boy who was so emaciated he appeared mummified could have
been avoided if his parents had not neglected him for years, a judge said . . . in finding the
couple guilty of first-degree murder. Justice Karen Horner said Emil and Rodica Radita were in
gross denial of their 15-year-old son Alexandru’s disease. . . . Alexandru, one of eight children,
weighed less than 37 pounds when he died . . . of complications due to untreated diabetes and
starvation. Horner said it appeared that Alex had received an insufficient level of care for “likely
a number of years,” even though the Raditas were fully trained on how to look after him.
Alberta’s chief medical examiner testified at the couple’s trial that an autopsy showed the teen
was severely underweight, covered in ulcers and nearly toothless. There were several signs the
boy had been subjected to neglect and starvation.”1
The story of Alex Radita is a clear example of a life gone wrong. It is impossible to read this story and not
feel horrified and heart-broken. Again, note that this is not a moral judgment about the boy. His life was
not horrifying in the sense that he was a bad person or made the wrong moral choices. His own moral
character and actions are not in question here. When we say that his life was terrible, we are not making
a moral judgment—we are judging his well-being. His life was not one that anyone would wish for. The
job of value theory is to explain why we ought to make this judgment. What exactly was deficient about
the boy’s life?
1 Bill Graveland, “Parents Found guilty of First-Degree Murder in Death of Diabetic, Starved Son,” The Canadian
Press (Calgary, Alberta), Feb. 24, 2017.2
In general, there are three competing theories of value. Each of them is plausible in some way. We can
use the example of Alex to try to get an initial sense of what each theory says about well-being by noting
that there are at least three ways of explaining what went wrong in this child’s life.
Objective list theories argue that our lives go well to the extent that they contain certain standard
features, common to all good human lives. As we will see, there are a variety of objective list theories,
and we will focus on the one called eudaimonism. In fact, we have already examined this theory to
some extent in our discussion of virtue ethics. Remember that before getting into the normative theory
of virtue ethics, Aristotle pointed to several standard features that he thought make people’s lives go
well. For example, physical health, good relationships with family members, friendships, education,
productive work, and financial security contribute to a good life. These are usually called “external
goods,” to contrast them with the “internal good” of having a good moral character. These external
goods are not part of whether we are morally good people or not, but they do contribute directly to
eudaimonia, which Aristotle took to be the natural goal of human life. Aristotle’s list is not an
unreasonable one—these are goods most people usually expect to find in a life of well-being. Every one
of them seems to have been missing from Alex’s life, and that is part of what dismays us about his
situation. The boy’s life had almost none of the objective elements that we would normally think a
human life should have.
Hedonism argues that our lives go well to the extent that we experience pleasure and avoid pain. One of
the most distressing things about Alex’s story is the sheer amount of suffering in the child’s life. While
it’s true that people experience pleasure and pain differently, there is no possibility that the boy’s last
years were anything other than painful. He died slowly in great physical suffering and emotional
anguish. He was isolated and neglected while his body slowly stopped functioning. It is hard to imagine a
more painful existence.
Desire satisfaction theory argues that our lives go well to the extent that our desires are fulfilled. Now,
desires can be quite subjective, and it’s hard to say precisely what Alex might have desired in life. But it’s
probably not a stretch to guess that a fifteen-year-old boy desires to make friends, play sports or
participate in other hobbies, go on dates, and so on. It’s hard to guess what exactly the boy’s desires
might have been, but whatever they were, none of them were fulfilled by lying in bed for years, sick and
neglected. And that’s a big part of what is so horrible about imagining his situation.
So, initially, each of these three theories offers a plausible approach to the question of what makes a life
go well or badly. Each picks out particular things that, if present, seem to make a life worth living and, if
absent, seem to degrade that life. Since each of theory is plausible on the face of it, let’s examine the
three theories more closely to discover both their strengths and their weaknesses. 3
Objective List Theories (Eudaimonism)
Objective list theories attempt to specify a list of goods that we expect good lives to include. There are
many different versions of this theory, but we will focus on eudaimonism, which we have already seen
in Aristotle. Aristotle argued that we need both external and internal goods in order for our lives to go
well, and that in general, our lives go well to the extent that we actualize our natural human potentials
and acquire these goods.
All of us have certain potentials, simply by virtue of the f